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Abstract	If	the	UK	cannot	secure	a	‘Norway’	deal	and	stay	within	the	internal	market	after	Brexit,	the	UK	will	lose	passporting	rights	for	EU	financial	services	and	access	to	euro	clearing	and	settlement,	both	of	which	make	London	attractive	as	a	financial	centre.	A	substantial	part	of	the	UK’s	wholesale	banking	and	trading	sector	may	move	out.			
1. The	City	of	London	outside	the	European	Economic	Area	Part	 of	 London’s	 attractiveness	 as	 international	 financial	 centre	 is	 the	 access	 to	 the	internal	market	of	the	wider	European	Economic	Area	(EEA).	By	using	a	UK	licence	as	European	passport,	 foreign	financial	 firms	can	offer	their	financial	services	throughout	the	 EEA.	 London	 as	 financial	 centre	 is	 also	 home	 to	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 euro-denominated	 trading	 with	 access	 to	 euro-settlement	 and	 clearing	 systems.	 If	 the	 UK	cannot	 secure	 a	 “Norway”	 deal	 and	 stay	within	 EEA	 after	 Brexit,	 the	UK	will	 lose	 the	passporting	rights	and	access	to	the	euro-settlement	and	clearing	systems.		Analysing	 the	 impact	 on	 banking	 and	 insurance,	 we	 find	 that	 the	 insurance	 industry	makes	very	limited	use	of	the	passport	in	comparison	to	the	banking	industry.	Next,	we	analyse	 the	 impact	 on	 wholesale	 banking	 and	 securities	 and	 derivatives	 trading.	 The	French	President,	Hollande,	has	 already	announced	 that	 the	City	of	 London	 should	no	longer	be	able	to	clear	euro-denominated	trades	after	Brexit	(FT,	2016).		Our	 findings	 on	 wholesale	 banking	 and	 trading	 are	 indicative.	 The	 early	 numbers	suggest	that	up	to	half	of	the	total	UK	banking	system	relates	to	wholesale	banking	in	the	City	 of	 London.	 Wholesale	 banking	 covers	 the	 full	 remit	 of	 trading	 and	 derivatives	activities	 and	 takes	 place	 in	 several	 currencies	 (US	 dollar,	 euro	 and	 pound	 sterling).	Next,	we	 find	 that,	 in	particular,	 the	OTC	derivatives	markets	might	be	affected,	 as	75	percent	of	euro-denominated	OTC	interest	rate	derivatives	are	traded	in	London.			 																																																									1	This	paper	will	appear	as	Chapter	4	in	The	Economics	of	the	UK-EU	Relationship:	From	the	Treaty	of	Rome	
to	the	Brexit	Vote,	edited	by	N.	Campos	and	F.	Coricelli,	Palgrave	McMillan,	London.	The	paper	draws	on	two	blogposts	“Losing	“EU	passport”	would	damage	City	of	London”	and	“Lost	passports:	a	guide	 to	 the	Brexit	 fallout	 for	the	City	of	London”	published	in	June	2016	at	Bruegel.	The	author	would	 like	to	thank	Uuree	Batsaikhan	and	Elena	Vaccarino	for	excellent	research	assistance.		
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2. The	development	of	London’s	position	London	is	the	wholesale	banking	hub	of	the	EU.	Figure	1	illustrates	inward	banking	from	other	EU	countries	and	 from	 third	 countries.	Cross-border	business	 from	banks	head-quartered	 in	other	EU	 countries	has	declined	 from	an	all	 time	high	of	 £	2.1	 trillion	 in	2008	to	£	1.1	trillion	in	2015.	While	this	trend	is	is	line	with	the	general	decline	in	cross-border	 banking	 in	 the	 EU	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis,	 the	 decline	 is	more	pronounced	in	the	UK.	By	contrast,	cross-border	banking	from	third	countries	has	remained	high	at	£	2.2	trillion	throughout	this	period.	Zooming	 in	 on	 inward	 banking	 from	 third	 countries,	 Figure	 2	 shows	 that	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 third	 country	banking	 in	 the	EU	 takes	place	 in	 the	UK.	Only	20	percent	 is	directed	towards	other	EU	countries.	There	is	a	slight	decline	of	the	UK’s	position	from	83	percent	 in	2003	to	77	percent	 in	2015.	Figure	2	confirms	the	dominant	position	of	London	as	the	global	banking	hub	of	Europe.	In	this	chapter,	we	review	the	possible	 impact	of	Brexit	on	the	size	of	 the	UK	financial	sector.	Haldane,	Brennan	and	Madouros	(2010)	provide	an	interesting	discussion	on	the	contribution	 of	 the	 financial	 sector	 to	 the	 economy:	 what	 is	 the	 value	 added	 of	 the	financial	sector	and	how	to	measure	it.				
Figure	1:	Development	of	UK	banking	sector	(in	GBP	trillions)	
	Source:	Author	calculations	based	on	ECB	(2015).	Notes:	The	assets	of	the	UK	banking	sector	are	split	in	assets	of	domestic	banks,	assets	of	banks	from	EU	countries	and	assets	of	banks	from	third	countries.		
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Figure	2:		Cross-border	banking	from	third	countries	(share	in	%)	
	Source:	Author	calculations	based	on	ECB	(2015).	Notes:	Total	cross-border	assets	of	banks	from	third	countries	are	broken	down	in	the	UK	and	the	rest	of	the	EU.		Moving	to	the	forex	market,	Figure	3	 illustrates	the	pre-eminent	position	of	London	in	the	 foreign	 exchange	 (forex)	market.	 This	 position	 has	 even	 increased	 from	 32	 to	 37	percent	over	the	2003-2016	period.	Forex	turnover	in	the	UK	is	twice	as	large	as	that	in	the	US	(19	percent).	Figure	4	shows	the	OTC	interest	rate	derivatives	market.	While	the	UK	has	also	been	the	top	global	trading	hub	up	to	2013,	the	US	has	overtaken	the	prime	position	 in	2016.	This	switch	mirrors	 the	underlying	shift	 from	EUR	to	USD	contracts.	The	average	daily	turnover	of	US	dollar	contracts	rose	from	$639	billion	in	April	2013	to	$1.4	trillion	in	April	2016.	By	contrast,	that	of	euro-denominated	contracts	–	historically	the	most	 actively	 traded	 segment	 –	 declined	 from	 $1.1	 trillion	 in	 April	 2013	 to	 $638	billion	in	April	2016	(BIS,	2016).	The	UK	is	a	major	trading	hub	for	euro-denominated	contracts	(see	Section	7	below).			
Figure	3:	Foreign	exchange	turnover	(%	share	of	total)	
	Source:	2016	Triennial	Central	Bank	Survey	of	Foreign	Exchange	and	OTC	Derivatives	Markets	(BIS,	2016)			
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Figure	4:	OTC	interest	rate	derivatives	turnover	(%	share	of	total)	
	Source:	2016	Triennial	Central	Bank	Survey	of	Foreign	Exchange	and	OTC	Derivatives	Markets	(BIS,	2016)			
3. The	passport		The	internal	market	is	underpinned	by	a	network	of	Directives	and	Regulations,	which	permit	access	 to	other	EEA	member	states	 if	a	 firm	has	a	 licence	 in	one	member	state	(the	‘home’	member	state).	The	most	important	directives	for	financial	services	are:	- the	Capital	Requirements	Directive	(CRD	IV,	2013/36/EU)	for	banking	- the	 Insurance	 and	 Reinsurance	 Directive	 (Solvency	 II,	 2009/138/EC)	 for	insurance	- the	 Markets	 in	 Financial	 Instruments	 Directive	 (MiFID,	 2004/39/EC)	 for	investment	services	- the	Alternative	 Investment	Fund	Managers	Directive	 (AIFMD,	2011/61/EU)	 for	hedge	funds	and	private	equity	- the	Prospectus	Directive	(2010/73/EC)	for	issuing	securities	- the	 Undertakings	 for	 the	 Collective	 Investment	 in	 Transferable	 Securities	Directive	(UCITS,	2009/65/EC)	for	marketing	and	trading	investment	funds		We	 illustrate	 the	 how	 the	 passport	 works	 legally	 with	 the	 Capital	 Requirements	Directive	 (CRD	 IV),	 the	 legal	 framework	 for	 credit	 institutions	 (banks).	 The	 passport	consist	of	several	elements	of	the	CRD	IV:	
• Licence:	 	 Title	 III	 of	 CRD	 IV	 (Articles	 8	 to	 21)	 specifies	 the	 requirements	 for	access	to	activity	of	credit	institutions.	The	main	element	is	authorisation	by	the	home	supervisor,	which	provides	the	single	licence.	
• Freedom	 of	 establishment:	 Title	 V	 (Articles	 33-39)	 contains	 the	 provisions	concerning	the	freedom	of	establishment	and	the	freedom	to	provide	services.	It	means	 that	 if	 a	 credit	 institution	 is	 authorised	 in	 one	member	 state,	 it	 has	 the	freedom	 to	 establish	 a	 branch	 in	 (or	 to	 provide	 services	 to)	 any	 other	 EEA	member	state	without	prior	approval.	The	credit	institution	only	needs	to	notify	the	host	country	supervisor.	
• Home	 supervision:	 Title	 VII	 sets	 out	 the	 principles	 of	 prudential	 supervision,	which	 predominantly	 gives	 powers	 to	 the	 home	 supervisor	 with	 some	 very	limited	powers	 for	 the	host	 supervisor	 in	 the	area	of	 liquidity	 supervision.	 	As	these	powers	of	 liquidity	 supervision	are	 related	 to	 the	operations	 in	different	
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currencies,	 the	 new	 European	 Banking	 Supervision	 framework	 has	 decided	 to	give	up	 these	host	 country	powers	within	 the	euro	area,	which	uses	 the	 single	currency	(Schoenmaker	and	Véron,	2016).			This	 system	 of	 full	 access	 based	 on	 a	 single	 passport	 provided	 by	 the	 home-country	supervisor	is	limited	to	the	EEA.	So	if	the	UK	were	to	leave	the	EEA,	UK	licenced	banks	(whether	or	not	headquartered	 in	 the	UK)	would	need	to	obtain	an	extra	 licence	 from	the	host	supervisor	 in	an	EEA	member	state	 in	order	to	offer	 financial	services	 in	that	member	state.		An	extra	 licence	would	be	necessary	 for	 all	 forms	of	 cross-border	 services,	 ie	 through	the	 establishment	 of	 a	 branch	 or	 subsidiary	 or	 through	 the	 direct	 offering	 of	 cross-border	services.	The	UK	would	then	become	a	third	country,	which	would	need	to	find	a	point	 of	 access	 into	 the	 EEA	 for	 business.	 Similarly,	 EEA	 financial	 institutions	 would	need	to	apply	for	a	licence	to	enter	the	UK.	The	passport	system	in	the	other	EU	financial	services	directives	is	similar	to	the	CRD	IV.			
4. Banking	vs	insurance	An	 interesting	 question	 is	 whether	 different	 financial	 sectors	 are	 equally	 affected	 by	possible	changes	in	passporting	arrangements	for	the	financial	sector.	We	examine	the	two	 largest	 financial	 sectors,	banking	and	 insurance.	 It	appears	 that	banking	relies	 far	more	on	the	passport	 than	 insurance.	We	measure	this	by	differentiating	cross-border	business	through	branches	(based	on	the	passport)	and	subsidiaries	(new	licence).			Table	1	reports	the	relative	share	of	branches	and	subsidiaries	in	cross-border	business.	The	passport	(branch)	is	not	important	for	insurance.	The	aggregate	number	for	all	EU	member	 states	 is	 13	 percent,	 and	 even	 less	 for	 the	UK	 at	 9	 percent.	 These	 are	minor	amounts.	 The	main	 vehicle	 is	 through	 subsidiaries,	 because	 insurers	 want	 to	 contain	‘insurance’	risk	in	separate	legal	entities.	At	the	aggregate	EU	level,	the	relative	share	of	branches	is	36	percent	for	banking.				Finally,	 European	 banks	 typically	 use	 their	 passport	 to	 enter	 the	 London	 wholesale	market;	 that	 is	 for	 69	 percent	 of	 the	 cases.	 Many	 international	 banks,	 including	 the	major	 European	 ones,	 have	 branches	 operating	 in	 London,	 which	 is	 an	 international	financial	centre,	but	actually	do	little	business	with	UK	clients	(Burrows	and	Low,	2015).		
Table	1:	Cross-border	business	by	type	of	entry	(2014)		 Type	of	entry	 Banking	 Insurance	EU-wide	 Branch	 36%	 13%	Subsidiary	 64%	 87%	United	Kingdom	 Branch	 69%	 9%	Subsidiary	 31%	 91%	Sources:	Banking	entry	data	are	from	ECB	(2015)	and	insurance	entry	data	from	Schoenmaker	and	Sass	(2016)	Note:	Banks	and	insurers	can	enter	other	member	states	by	branch	(no	further	licence	and	supervision)	or	by	subsidiary	(separate	licence	and	supervision	from	host	country).	The	table	reports	the	relative	share	of	branches	and	subsidiaries	in	cross-border	business.	The	first	rows	are	for	all	EU	member	states;	the	latter	rows	are	for	the	UK.		
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In	summary,	insurance	will	be	far	less	affected	than	banking	if	and	when	the	UK	leaves	the	EU.	Next,	 the	major	European	banks	would	need	 to	 apply	 for	 a	UK	 licence,	 if	 they	want	to	keep	on	doing	business	in	London.	In	turn,	the	UK	banks	would	need	to	apply	for	a	licence	in	the	EEA	(see	next	section).			
5. Wholesale	banking	What	is	the	size	of	London’s	wholesale	banking	activity?	Table	2	provides	an	overview	of	the	 total	UK	banking	 system.	Most	UK	banking	 assets	 (£3,570	billion)	 are	held	by	 the	major	 UK	 international	 banks:	 HSBC,	 RBS,	 Barclays	 and	 Standard	 Chartered.	 While	Standard	Chartered	operates	primarily	in	Asia,	the	first	three	are	active	in	Europe.	HSBC	and	RBS	have	already	a	subsidiary	(and	thus	a	licence)	on	the	continent:	HSBC	in	France	and	RBS	 in	 the	Netherlands.	Barclays	operates	 through	branches,	 for	example,	 in	 Italy	and	 France	 (Schoenmaker	 and	 Véron,	 2016).	 So,	 only	 Barclays	 might	 need	 an	 extra	licence	 to	enter	 the	EEA	after	Brexit.	Based	on	 the	banks’	annual	 reports,	we	estimate	that	about	one	third	of	the	total	assets	of	the	major	UK	banks	relate	to	their	trading	and	derivatives	books	in	London,	amounting	to	£1,180	billion.		The	major	domestic	UK	banks	and	other	UK	banks	have	most	of	their	operations	in	the	UK	 and	 concentrate	 on	 traditional	 banking	 business,	 with	 little	 or	 no	 trading	 or	derivatives	business.		Table	 2	 shows	 further	 that	 £1,730	 billion	 in	 assets	 in	 London	 is	 held	 by	 the	 major	international	 investment	 banks,	 mainly	 from	 the	 US	 and	 Switzerland.	 These	 US	 and	Swiss	investment	banks	use	London	as	a	hub	for	their	European	operations	(Goodhart	and	Schoenmaker,	2016).	Table	3	 indicates	 that	90	percent	of	European	 turnover	and	employees	of	the	five	large	US	investment	banks	(Goldman	Sachs,	JP	Morgan,	Citigroup,	Morgan	 Stanley,	 Bank	 of	 America	 Merrill	 Lynch)	 are	 located	 in	 London.	 These	investment	banks	use	 their	UK	passports	 (both	 the	banking	 licence	under	CRD	 IV	and	investment	services	licene	under	MiFID)	to	conduct	business	throughout	the	EEA.	These	investment	banks	are	currently	looking	for	a	new	passport	in	the	EEA.		At	 this	stage,	 it	 is	guesswork	how	much	of	 their	derivatives	and	securities	trading	and	corporate	 finance	 business	 US	 investment	 banks	 might	 move	 to	 continental	 Europe.	Early	estimates	indicate	a	minimum	of	20	percent.	At	some	point,	the	liquidity	in	certain	markets	might	move	 to	 the	 continent,	 in	which	 case	part	of	 the	 trading	 floor	will	 also	move	(OTC	derivatives	are	a	case	in	point;	see	next	section).		If	 the	US	 investment	banks	 relocate	part	of	 their	operations	 to	 the	euro	area,	 the	ECB	will	 become	 their	 supervisor	 if	 their	 assets	 are	 greater	 than	 €30	 billion.	 While	 it	 is	appropriate	 that	 a	 large	 supervisor	 like	 the	 ECB	 would	 be	 responsible,	 rather	 than	smaller	national	supervisors,	the	ECB	will	need	to	beef	up	its	markets	(derivatives	and	securities	 trading	 and	 corporate	 finance)	 expertise	 to	 do	 the	 job	 (Danielsson,	Macrae	and	Zigrand,	2016).		
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Table	2:	The	UK	banking	system	(end-2014)	
Type	of	Banks	 Total	assets	(in	£	billions)	 Wholesale	banking	in	London	(in	£	billions)	Major	UK	international	banks	 3,570	(45%)	 1,180	Major	UK	domestic	banks	 1,160	(15%)	 -	Other	UK	banks	 250	(3%)	 -	Rest	of	the	World	Investment	Banks	 1,730	(22%)	 1,730	Rest	of	the	World	Other	Banks	 460	(6%)	 310	Branches	from	EEA	banks	 790	(10%)	 530	Total	UK	banking	system	 7,960	(100%)	 3,750	Source:	Total	assets	based	on	Burrows	and	Low	(2015)	and	for	branches	from	EEA	banks	on	ECB	(2015).	Author	estimates	for	wholesale	banking	(trading	and	derivatives)	in	London.		Next,	the	category	‘rest	of	the	world	other	banks’	includes	subsidiaries	of	overseas	banks	operating	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom.	 Many	 international	 banks,	 including	 the	 major	European	ones,	also	have	substantial	branches	in	London,	including	Deutsche	Bank,	BNP	Paribas,	Societe	Generale,	ING	and	UniCredit.	Deutsche	Bank	with	total	assets	of	€	1.629	billion	 receives,	 for	 example,	 19	 percent	 of	 its	 net	 revenues	 from	 its	 UK	 branch	(Deutsche	Bank,	Annual	Report	2015).	Most	of	these	foreign	subsidiaries	and	branches	actually	do	little	business	with	UK	clients.	Our	conservative	estimate	is	that	two	thirds	of	their	UK	business	is	related	to	wholesale	banking.		
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Table	3:	European	operations	of	top	five	US	investment	banks:	Turnover	and	
Employees		(end	2014)	
Countries	 Panel	A:	Turnover	by	Country	(EUR	–millions	)		United	Kingdom	 22,744	 92%	Germany	 513	 2%	France	 361	 1%	Italy	 193	 1%	Ireland	 201	 1%	Luxembourg	 276	 1%	Other	EU	 438	 2%	Total	 24,727	 100%		
Countries	 Panel	B:	Number	of	Employees	by	Country		United	Kingdom	 26,629	 89%	Germany	 794	 3%	France	 293	 1%	Italy	 326	 1%	Ireland	 1,011	 3%	Luxembourg	 491	 2%	Other	EU	 365	 1%	Total	 29,909	 100%	Source:	Goodhart	and	Schoenmaker	(2016)	Note:	The	data	refer	to	the	five	US	investment	banks’	investment	banking	activities	in	Europe.	Goodhart	and	Schoenmaker	(2016)	provide	a	breakbown	for	each	bank.		In	 sum,	 Table	 2	 estimates	 that	 close	 to	 half	 (£3,750	 billion)	 of	 the	 total	 UK	 banking	system	 is	 related	 to	 wholesale	 banking	 in	 London.	 In	 the	 next	 section,	 we	 provide	 a	breakdown	of	wholesale	business	by	category	(securities	and	derivatives)	and	currency	(sterling,	dollar	and	euro).			
6. Infrastructure	Given	the	amount	of	euro-denominated	finance	carried	out	in	the	UK,	it	is	important	that	London,	within	the	EEA,	has	direct	access	to	the	infrastructure	for	wholesale	payments	(TARGET2)	 and	 clearing	 (LCH-Clearnet)	 in	 euros.	 TARGET2,	 the	 payments	 system	 for	the	 euro	 area,	 permits	 national	 central	 banks,	 banks	 and	 designated	 financial	institutions	within	 the	EEA	 to	 join	 even	 if	 they	 are	 outside	 the	 euro	 area	 (Armstrong,	2016).	UK	banks	and	other	designated	 financial	 institutions	are	permitted	 to	be	direct	participants	in	TARGET2	even	though	the	Bank	of	England	does	not	participate.		Armstrong	(2016)	argues	that	if	the	UK	were	to	leave	the	EU	and	not	join	the	EEA,	then	banks	 in	 the	UK	could	no	 longer	be	direct	members	of	TARGET2.	They	would	have	 to	operate	 through	 subsidiaries	 (or	 perhaps	 branches	 assuming	 the	 UK	 is	 deemed	‘equivalent’	 in	 terms	of	regulation)	within	the	EEA.	This	would	make	euro	banking	via	the	UK	more	expensive.	It	would	also	erode	the	attraction	of	London	as	a	destination	for	non-EEA	banks	to	establish	their	EU	headquarters.		
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Moving	 to	 clearing,	 central	 counterparties	 (CCPs)	 are	 important	 for	 the	 settlement	 of	securities	and	derivatives	transactions.	There	are	three	clearing	houses	operating	in	the	UK	 which	 are	 recognised	 by	 both	 the	 UK	 and	 the	 EU:	 CME	 Europe,	 a	 derivatives	exchange	 and	 wholly-owned	 subsidiary	 of	 US-based	 CME	 group,	 LCH.Clearnet	 Group	Ltd,	majority	owned	and	operated	by	the	London	Stock	Exchange	Group,	and	the	London	Metal	Exchange	Limited.	Of	the	three	clearing	houses,	LCH	has	by	far	the	biggest	share	of	euro-denominated	clearing	in	the	UK	(Batsaikhan,	2016).		The	European	Central	Bank	initially	exempted	the	UK	entity	of	LCH	from	Target2	as	part	of	 its	 ‘location	 requirement’,	 but	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 of	 the	 EU	 (ECJ)	 subsequently	decided	 that	 the	 ECB	 has	 no	 competence	 under	 the	 Treaty	 on	 the	 Functioning	 of	 the	European	 Union	 (TFEU)	 to	 impose	 such	 requirements	 on	 the	 clearing	 houses.	Furthermore,	 by	 imposing	 location	 requirements,	 the	 ECB	 violated	 the	 freedom	 of	establishment,	 freedom	to	provide	services	and	freedom	of	movement	of	capital	 in	the	single	market	(Batsaikhan,	2016;	Armstrong,	2016).	But	outside	the	EEA,	the	UK	would	no	 longer	 have	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 TFEU	 and	 the	 ECJ.	 This	 is	 no	 problem	 for	LCH.Clearnet	Group	itself,	as	it	has	major	entities	in	New	York,	London	and	France	(see	Table	2).	If	needed,	LCH	can	thus	move	its	euro-denominated	clearing	business	to	Paris.			
Table	4:		LCH	Clearing	-	overview	
LCH.Clearnet	Group	
Subsidiary	 LCH.Clearnet	
Limited	
LCH.Clearnet	SA	 LCH.Clearnet	LLC	
Location	 London,	UK	 Paris,	France	 New	York,	US	
Products	 OTC	Swaps,	Forex,	Derivatives,	Equities	and	Bonds,	Repos	 Derivatives,	Equities	and	Bonds,	Credit	default	swaps,	Repos	
OTC	Swaps	
Profit	after	tax	
(mln.	Euros),	2015	
63.8	 28.2	 10.2	
Headcount,	2015	 452	 168	 12	Source:	LCH	Annual	Report	2015.			
7. Trading	The	 final	 step	 for	 the	 assessment	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 Brexit	 on	 the	 City	 of	 London	 is	 an	estimation	of	 euro-denominated	 trading.	At	 the	outset,	we	 stress	 that	our	 calculations	provide	 a	 preliminary	 assessment	 of	 the	 main	 market	 segments	 and	 should	 be	interpreted	with	some	caution.	The	main	purpose	of	our	preliminary	calculations	 is	 to	get	an	idea	of	the	possible	impact.		The	main	wholesale	financial	markets	in	London	cover:	
• Derivatives	
• Foreign	exchange	trading	
• Private	and	public	bond	trading	
• Equity	trading	
• Commodities	trading		
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If	 access	 to	 euro	 clearing	 and	 settlement	 in	 London	 ceases,	 we	 expect	 the	 greatest	impact	to	be	on	the	bond	and	derivatives	markets.	Forex	is	an	international	market,	 in	which	London	has	a	prime	position.	Settlement	of	FX	transactions	happens	through	CLS	(originally	 Continous	 Linked	 Settlement),	 the	 largest	 multicurrency	 cash	 settlement	system	to	mitigate	 settlement	 risk	 for	 the	FX	transactions	of	 its	member	banks,	and	 is	thus	not	dependent	on	London’s	access	to	TARGET2.	That	would	therefore	not	need	to	change	should	access	 to	TARGET2	be	stopped.	Next,	 the	settlement	of	equity	 trades	 is	closely	 linked	 to	 the	 respective	 stock	 exchanges,	 on	 which	 the	 equity	 trades	 are	executed.	 Finally,	 commodities	 (e.g.	 crude	 oil	 and	 metals)	 trading	 is	 largely	 a	 dollar-denominated	business.		The	 BIS	 Triennial	 Central	 Bank	 Survey	 of	 foreign	 exchange	 and	 derivatives	 market	activity	is	the	largest	survey	in	its	field	(BIS,	2016).	Table	5	provides	figures	for	the	OTC	single	currency	interest	rate	derivatives,	which	counts	for	the	majority	(79	percent)	of	the	global	OTC	derivatives	market.	It	shows	that	London	accounts	for	about	75	percent	of	euro-denominated	trades	and	New	York	for	78	percent	of	the	US	dollar	trades	in	2016	(Panel	B	of	Table	5).	These	large	shares	are	no	surprise,	because	these	two	markets	are	the	most	liquid	interest	rate	derivatives	markets	in	euros	and	dollars,	respectively,	and	thus	attract	the	majority	of	trading	in	the	respective	currencies.	While	50	percent	of	the	global	OTC	interest	rate	derivatives	market	related	to	euro-denominated	derivatives	in	2013,	this	position	was	taken	over	by	dollar-denominated	derivatives	in	2016.		
Table	5.	Global	OTC	single	currency	interest	rate	derivatives	turnover	in	April	
2013	and	2016,	(Daily	averages	in	millions	of	USD)	
	Panel	A	 France	 Germany	 United	Kingdom	 United	States	 TOTAL	
	April	
	2013	 Amount	
Share	of	
total	(%)	 Amount	
Share	of	
total	(%)	 Amount	
Share	of	
total	(%)	 Amount	
Share	of	
total	(%)	 Amount	
Euro	 141,245	 10.6%	 88,125	 6.6%	 927,840	 69.4%	 27,090	 2.0%	 1,336,075	
Pound	
sterling	 4,746	 2.3%	 4,728	 2.3%	 189,802	 91.9%	 3,162	 1.5%	 206,643	
US	dollar	 52,080	 6.7%	 6,205	 0.8%	 110,235	 14.2%	 546,268	 70.4%	 776,268	
	TOTAL		 202,210	 7.3%	 101,347	 3.7%	 1,347,749	 48.9%	 628,153	 22.8%	 2,758,583		
	Panel	B	 France	 Germany	 United	Kingdom	 United	States	 TOTAL	
	April	
	2016	 Amount	
Share	of	
total	(%)	 Amount	
Share	of	
total	(%)	 Amount	
Share	of	
total	(%)	 Amount	
Share	of	
total	(%)	 Amount	
Euro	 100,648	 13.2%	 16,562	 2.2%	 573,664	 75.2%	 6,832	 0.9%	 762,494	
Pound	
sterling	 6,648	 2.5%	 509	 0.2%	 247,489	 94.8%	 2,333	 0.9%	 261,113	
US	dollar	 26,833	 1.8%	 2,455	 0.2%	 215,157		 14.4%	 1,167,958	 78.0%	 1,497,627	
	TOTAL		 141,215	 4.7	%	 31,311	 1.0%	 1,180,246	 39.0%	 1,240,774	 41.0%	 3,028,031		Source:	BIS	Triennial	Central	Bank	Survey	of	foreign	exchange	and	derivatives	markets	activity	(BIS,	2015	and	2016)		What	do	these	statistics	tell	us?	First,	the	City	of	London	is	currently	home	to	the	main	market	 in	 euro-denominated	 interest	 rate	 derivatives	 (with	 75	 percent	 of	 euro-
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denominated	trading).	Second,	the	potential	impact	for	the	City	of	London	is	that	up	to	49	 percent	 (=	 $573.7	 billion/$1,180.2	 billion)	 of	 its	 interest	 rate	 derivatives	 market	could	 move	 to	 continental	 Europe	 after	 Brexit.	 Third,	 France	 is	 emerging	 as	 the	dominant	 player	 on	 the	 continent.	 France	 improved	 its	 share	 of	 euro-denominated	derivatives	from	10.6	percent	in	2013	to	13.2	percent	in	2016,	while	Germany	dropped	from	6.6	to	2.2	percent	over	the	same	period.			Bond	trading	is	less	centralised	and	done	through	different	platforms,	each	of	which	has	its	own	clearing	and	settlement	arrangements.	Therefore,	we	cannot	speak	of	a	central	market	place(s).	Nevertheless,	we	try	to	give	a	picture	of	activity	using	two	indicators:	amounts	outstanding	and	cleared	trades.	Table	6	provides	an	overview	of	the	amount	of	outstanding	private	debt	securities	in	the	major	countries:	France,	Germany,	the	UK	and	the	 US.	 The	 amounts	 are	 broken	 down	 by	 type	 of	 bond	 (bank,	 other	 financial	 or	corporate)	 and	 currency	 (euro	 and	 US	 dollar).	 The	 relative	 share	 of	 outstanding	securities	is	a	good	proxy	for	the	relative	share	of	trading.	London	has	a	less	dominant	position	in	the	private	bond	market	than	in	the	derivatives	market.	The	UK	market	share	of	euro-denominated	private	bonds	is	about	16	percent,	while	Germany	and	France	have	21	and	14	percent	respectively.	Moreover,	in	the	corporate	bond	segment,	Germany	(27	percent)	and	France	(22	percent)	have	larger	market	shares	than	the	UK	(11	percent).	
	
Table	6.	Private	debt	securities	outstanding,	Q1	2016	(in	billion	USD)	
		 France	 Germany	 United	Kingdom	 United	States	 TOTAL	
		 Amount	 Share	of	total	(%)	 Amount	
Share	of	
total	(%)	 Amount	
Share	of	
total	(%)	 Amount	
Share	of	
total	(%)	 Amount	
Euro	 2029.6	 21.2	 1373.1	 14.4	 1568.3	 16.4	 1084.1	 11.3	 9555.2	
- banks	 900.1	 20.3	 368.2	 8.3	 795	 17.9	 384.6	 8.7	 4436.6	
- other	financials	 467.1	 17.9	 460.8	 17.6	 505.1	 19.3	 259.3	 9.9	 2616.1	
- corporates	 662.4	 26.5	 544.1	 21.7	 268.2	 10.7	 440.2	 17.6	 2502.5	
US	dollar	 614.9	 4.3	 934.2	 6.5	 1678.6	 11.8	 3929.1	 27.5	 14267.2	
- banks	 225.4	 4.5	 386.2	 7.8	 821.1	 16.5	 720.5	 14.5	 4973.4	
- other	financials	 225.2	 4.0	 450.4	 8.0	 522.1	 9.3	 2514.9	 44.8	 5618.2	
- corporates	 164.3	 4.5	 97.6	 2.7	 335.4	 9.1	 693.7	 18.9	 3675.6	
	TOTAL		 5289	 	 4614.6	 	 6493.8	 	 10026.4	 	 47644.8	Source:	BIS,	Debt	securities	issues	and	amounts	outstanding,	Table	C3.	Note:	Amount	of	issue	for	each	country	is	the	sum	of	resident	issuers	and	national	issuers.	Total	amount	is	the	total	for	all	countries.		Moving	 to	 government	 bond	 trading,	 Figure	 5	 shows	 the	monthly	 amount	 of	 cleared	government	bond	 trades	 (both	 cash	bond	and	 repo	 trades)	 executed	by	LCH.Clearnet.	The	UK	entity	clears	trades	for	the	following	markets:	Austrian,	Belgian,	Dutch,	German,	Irish,	Finnish,	Portuguese,	Slovakian,	Slovenian	and	UK	government	bonds.	The	French	entity	processes	the	cash	trades	and	repos	for	Italian,	French	and	Spanish	government	securities.	LCH.Clearnet	thus	serves	the	major	markets	for	euro-area	government	bonds.	It	 is	 interesting	 to	 see	 that	 French	 entity	 has	 recently	 overtaken	 the	UK	 entity,	 partly	because	of	the	increased	trade	in	euro	government	bonds	from	the	south	of	Europe.		
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The	 trading	 and	 clearing	of	 the	bonds	of	 the	nine	 euro-area	 governments,	which	now	done	in	the	UK,	could	be	easily	transferred	to	the	French	entity,	if	the	UK	entity	can	no	longer	clear	euro-denominated	 trades.	Figure	5	shows	 that	monthly	government	bond	trading	amounts	to	€6	trillion,	both	in	the	UK	and	France.		It	 should	be	noted	 that	LCH.Clearnet	 shows	only	a	partial	picture	of	 euro	government	bond	 clearing.	 Euroclear	 in	 Brussels	 and	 Clearstream	 in	 Frankfurt	 also	 clear	 a	 large	amount	of	euro-area	government	bonds.		
Figure	5:	Monthly	amount	of	cleared	government	bond	trades	by	LCH	(in	EUR	
billions)	
	Source:	LCH,	http://www.lch.com/asset-classes/repoclear/volumes			In	summary,	the	City	of	London	has	a	dominant	position	in	the	euro-denominated	OTC	derivatives	markets,	which	it	might	lose	after	Brexit.	Its	position	in	bond	trading	is	more	on	par	with	France	and	Germany.			
8. Future	relationship	with	the	EU	in	financial	services	Negotiations	about	the	future	relationship	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	have	still	to	start	at	the	time	of	writing	(September	2016).	Pisani-Ferry	et	al	(2016)	give	an	overview	of	the	different	models	for	market	access	provided	by	the	EU	to	financial	sectors	in	non-EU	member	 states	 (i.e.	 Norway	model,	 Switzerland	model,	 Turkey	model,	 Canada	model,	and	 the	WTO	model).	 A	 key	 issue	 is	whether	 the	 UK	wants	 to	 remain	 in	 the	 internal	market.	 An	 important	 requirement	 for	 staying	 within	 the	 internal	 market	 is	 the	acceptance	 of	 the	 supranational	 institutions	 (the	 European	 Commission	 and	 the	European	 Court	 of	 Justice),	 which	 uphold	 the	 appropriate	 functioning	 of	 the	 internal	market.	Pisani-Ferry	et	 al	 (2016)	have	made	a	proposal	 for	 a	 continental	partnership,	whereby	 the	UK	would	have	a	say	on	EU	policies	but	ultimate	 formal	authority	would	remain	with	the	EU.	This	partnership	could	keep	the	UK	in	the	internal	market.		If	 the	UK	were	not	 to	remain	 in	 the	 internal	market,	 it	would	become	a	 third	country.	The	EU	applies	an	equivalence	regime,	which	allows	access	to	an	EU	country	from	third	countries	 if	 the	EU	(the	European	Commission	and/or	relevant	supervisors)	deem	the	supervision	 of	 the	 third	 country	 equivalent	 (Goodhart	 and	 Schoenmaker,	 2016).	
0	1.000	
2.000	3.000	
4.000	5.000	
6.000	7.000	
8.000	 UK	entity																French	entity	
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Nevertheless,	 the	 relevant	 supervisor(s)	 in	 the	EU	 country	 can	 still	 impose	 regulatory	and	supervisory	requirements.	Moreover,	the	third	country	licence	does	not	provide	the	passport	to	do	business	across	the	EU.			Whatever	 model	 is	 chosen,	 there	 is	 a	 need	 for	 transitional	 arrangements	 to	 provide	certainty	 to	 financial	services	and	markets	 in	 the	period	between	the	UK’s	withdrawal	and	 its	 future	 relationship	 with	 the	 EU	 (Schoenmaker,	 2016).	 A	 key	 element	 in	 the	transition	 is	 grandfather	 clauses	 and	 a	 sufficiently	 long	 grace	 period.	 Grandfathering	allows	 a	 smooth	 transition	 from	 the	 old	 to	 the	 new	 regime.	 It	 means	 that	 a	 licence	received	 under	 the	 old	 regime	 remains	 valid	 under	 the	 new	 regime	 (i.e.	 is	grandfathered).	 Another	 element	 is	 the	 legal	 form	of	 the	 partnership	 between	 the	 EU	and	the	UK.	The	more	this	relationship	is	hard-wired	in	a	Treaty,	the	less	scope	there	is	for	 changing	 parts	 of	 the	 relationship	 in	 the	 future.	 This	 provides	more	 certainty	 for	financial	services	providers.	Nevertheless,	 it	will	be	difficult	to	address	the	uncertainty	on	the	outcome	during	the	negotiations.	A	clear	and	joint	vision	on	the	desired	outcome	from	the	outset	and	a	relatively	speedily	negotiation	are	helpful	to	keep	this	uncertainty	to	a	minimum.				The	UK	government	faces	for	its	financial	services	sector	a	fundamental	choice	between	global	and	EU	business.	On	the	one	hand,	London	can	position	itself	as	an	international	financial	 centre	with	 light-touch	 regulation	and	 supervision	 to	 try	 to	gain	extra	global	business.	But	under	 that	model,	 the	equivalence	of	UK	regulation	and	supervision	will	come	 under	 pressure,	 which	makes	 access	 to	 the	 EU	more	 difficult	 and	 cumbersome	(extra	regulatory	and	supervisory	requirements	from	the	EU).	On	the	other	hand,	the	UK	can	choose	to	remain	close	(i.e.	equivalent)	to	EU	legislation	and	thus	favour	its	regional	business	in	the	EU.	Under	this	model,	London	can	still	attract	global	business,	as	it	does	currently.										 	
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